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ABSTRACT	 The	UK	 is	 a	 country	with	 only	 low	 to	moderate	 seismicity,	 and	 the	 long	 intervals	
between significant earthquakes in Britain results in people forgetting they occur. As 
a result, seismic hazard was only thought of for the first time in Britain in 1976. For 
ordinary construction, it is true that seismic hazard can be considered insignificant in 
the UK, but for strategic facilities, especially those with a high consequence of failure, 
such as nuclear power plants (NPPs), seismic hazard is important. This paper traces 
the history of such studies, with emphasis on those for the nuclear industry. The UK 
seismological community saw major investment from the nuclear industry after 1980. 
There was a cessation of NPP construction in Britain after 1995, but in recent years 
steps have been taken towards a resumption of NPP building, which will see a need for 
new seismic hazard studies.
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1. Introduction
There is a widespread misapprehension that Britain is a country without earthquakes; and 
before the 1970s, this notion extended to the UK engineering community. This was despite the 
fact that the first commercial nuclear power plant (NPP) in the UK commenced operation in 1956. 
Memory is short, and the fact that significant earthquakes in the UK are uncommon means that 
they are easily forgotten. Earthquakes strongly felt in London get far more media attention than 
those elsewhere (and this was as true in the 16th century as it is today), and the last earthquake 
widely felt in London was back in 1938 (Neilson et al., 1984; Musson, 1994).
2. Early seismic hazard studies in the UK
Around the mid 1970s, awareness dawned that even in a low seismicity country like the UK, 
earthquakes still occur, and can be sufficiently large (albeit rarely) to be significant for high-
consequence structures. The first structure in the UK, so far as I am aware, that was built with 
potential earthquake hazard in mind, was the Kessock Bridge near Inverness, and here the impetus 
was the belief that the Great Glen Fault, which the bridge spans, is still an active strike-slip feature 
[which is open to doubt: Musson (2007)]. At that date the last study of historical earthquakes in 
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the UK was that of Davison (1924). The report on local seismicity compiled for the Kessock 
Bridge was therefore the first work on historical seismicity in the UK in 50 years (Browitt et al.,	
1976), the previous one being the British earthquake catalogue of Davison (1924).
Browitt et al. (1976) seems also to have been the first published study in the UK in which 
historical earthquakes were critically revaluated from original source data. The study reproduced 
verbatim historical accounts from original newspaper descriptions, and assessed epicentral 
intensity values using both the Modifed Mercalli (1956) and Medvedev-Sponheur-Karník scales, 
and felt areas, and gave approximate magnitudes, but how these were derived is not discussed. 
The study makes the point that earthquakes in the mountainous north of Scotland have tended to 
“migrate” to settled regions; in other words, the population distribution affects the distribution of 
felt reports and this has caused misperceptions as to where the epicentres lay.
The companion hazard report by Burton and Browitt (1976) made an informal estimate of 
the 100-year event as 5.2 mb, and the 250-year event as 5.6 mb, these values taken from a rather 
approximate magnitude-frequency equation for the whole Inverness region. The authors then 
selected some strong ground motion records from California that were considered comparable to 
what might be expected at Inverness. This can be viewed as quasi-deterministic in nature.
At about the same time, Lilwall of the Institute of Geological Sciences [(IGS) now British 
Geological Survey (BGS)] was working on an attempt to prepare a numerate version of Davison’s 
(1924) catalogue, updated to the present day. This catalogue was the basis of Lilwall’s (1976) 
hazard map of Great Britain, the first quantitative assessment of seismic hazard in the UK. Lilwall’s 
catalogue never progressed beyond a working file, and, as it did not refer back to original sources, 
incorporated many errors due to Davison’s (1924) faulty compilation (to give Davison his due, he 
was a mathematics schoolmaster, not a historian).
3. Seismic hazard and the UK nuclear industry
It was now very apparent that British seismicity needed to be addressed by the nuclear industry, 
and a lead in this was taken by the then Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), and also 
the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate [(NII) now Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR)], part of 
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), to whom by law regulatory oversight is given under the 
provisions of the Nuclear Installations Act of 1965. As a result, a large amount of investigation 
into UK seismicity was undertaken, principally by two consultancies (PML, 1982; SML, 1982), 
Imperial College London (Ambraseys and Melville, 1983), and BGS (Burton et al., 1984 and 
references therein). In addition, funding was secured to expand the UK seismic monitoring 
network, which in the 1970s amounted only to a handful of stations in the Scottish Midlands 
(LOWNET), which were hardly suitable for detecting earthquakes in the south of England. Interest 
in seismicity was also taken by the offshore oil and gas industries, in connection with hydrocarbon 
development in the North Sea. This later led to several studies of general offshore hazard, notably 
Musson	et al. (1997) and EQE (2002), both of which included hazard maps for the UK territorial 
waters. Hazard studies have also been undertaken from time to time for individual offshore sites, 
though it is not practical to compile a list of all these.
One interesting fact about the development of seismic hazard analysis in the UK at this early 
period is that there was never any interest in the deterministic method popular in Europe, based on 
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maximum observed intensity. Right from the outset, aside from the Kessock Bridge study, hazard 
was conceived in probabilistic terms, either from a Cornell-like approach or from extreme value 
methods [which is what Lilwall (1976) employed]. Even in Burton and Browitt (1976), hazard is 
tied to earthquake recurrence intervals, even if no probabilistic methodology is applied.
The only other method used for hazard calculation has been a stochastic approach, introduced 
by BGS in the mid 1990s, and even this gives identical results to the Cornell (1968)  method given 
the same input (Musson, 2012), and is fully probabilistic in nature.
The earliest hazard calculation specifically intended to be relevant to the nuclear industry was 
made by Irving (1979), who used a single uniform source covering the whole country to come 
up with a “typical” UK hazard value of 0.25 g peak ground acceleration (PGA) for a 10,000 year 
return period, a result that was later to be much used for mental “anchoring”.
In an update, Irving (1982) divided the UK into ten source zones. Remarkably, this was done 
on a purely geographical basis, with no reference to anything beyond what common parlance 
would consider to be different regions. Irving’s rationale seems to have been that where one 
draws zone boundaries is immaterial, because one simply proceeds to assess the seismicity rates 
that pertain to any zone. “Without recourse to tectonic regionalization it can be concluded … that 
the rough regional boundaries … can be used to rank regions in order of their seismic density per 
unit area …” (Irving, 1982). It does not seem to have occurred to Irving that, if the regions are 
not homogeneous with respect to earthquake generation, then the probabilistic seismic hazard 
analysis (PSHA) method is invalid.
Early hazard software used for site-specific analysis was EQRISK (McGuire, 1976), used 
by the consultancy Principia Mechanica Ltd. (PML), who made calculations of seismic hazard 
for various nuclear sites in the early 1980s (Woo, 2013: pers. comm.). In BGS an extreme value 
hazard program developed by Makropoulos (1978) was employed. An example of its use is found 
in Burton et al. (1981), calculating hazard for a hydrocarbon facility in the NE of Scotland. When 
the use of extreme value methods was discontinued, SEISRISK III (Bender and Perkins, 1987) 
was used for a while in BGS, later replaced by in-house software for stochastic simulation hazard 
estimation.
Spectral hazard for most UK NPPs was dealt with by anchoring standard spectral shapes to a 
computed PGA hazard amplitude. These were established in the 1980s and became entrenched 
through familiarity and regulatory acceptance, despite the fact that they were initially developed 
using very few records, and not updated as far more data became available. The development, use, 
and weaknesses of these standard spectra are reviewed in depth by Bommer et al. (2011).
While seismic hazard was not considered in the design basis of early nuclear plants in the UK, 
those designed after the early 1980s specifically included seismic loading as part of their design. 
For those built before this time, considerable effort has been expended to qualify the structures, 
plant and equipment. This included significant retrofitting of structures, systems and components 
(Weightman, 2011).
4. The Seismic Hazard Working Party
During the 1980s and 1990s, the majority of site-specific hazard studies for NPPs were 
undertaken by a group of consultants led by Mallard of the CEGB, and including staff from PML 
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(before it ceased trading in the UK) and Soil Mechanics Ltd. (SML). The Seismic Hazard Working 
Party (SHWP), as they were called, developed a consistent set of working practices for PSHA 
based around a rewritten version of EQRISK (McGuire, 1976) called PRISK, developed by Woo, 
which included the ability to implement a logic tree structure for handling epistemic uncertainty.
Some consistent features of the SHWP methodology can be recognised: extensive geological 
and tectonic research and speculation; use of a single simplified seismic source model; adherence 
to	MS (surface wave) as the only magnitude scale; use of a single model for strong ground motion; 
activity rates for sources modelled as a ten-point gamma distribution; and a regional b	 value	
with added small uncertainty. Ground motion was characterised as the larger of two horizontal 
components, rather than the geometric mean, which is the more common definition today. The 
lower bound magnitude used throughout was 4.0 MS. The SHWP also placed emphasis on how 
expert opinion should be treated: a consensus view, made iteratively through open discussion. 
This open discussion, which would be used to derive logic tree weights, was to be guided by 
sensitivity of the hazard results to the weighting adopted, and the need for conservatism. This 
approach to consensus modelling anticipates in some ways current thinking on Senior Seismic 
Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) methodology (USNRC, 2012).
The SHWP methodology used hardly changed from the mid 1980s to the late 1990s. A typical 
example study is SHWP (1987). One can see the logic, in that a completely consistent approach 
over fifteen years meant that there was never a question of an innovation in a later study casting 
doubt on the results of an earlier study. The disadvantage, however, was that no use could be made 
of developments in a fast-changing area of science. This particularly applies to ground motion 
modelling. The SHWP studies all used a single ground motion model for PGA, derived by PML 
(1982), augmented by a second model (PML, 1985) for earthquakes on modelled faults (it is not 
altogether clear why these should be treated separately) and a third (PML, 1988) for spectral 
acceleration.
The PML (1982) model was a product of its time, when worldwide resources of strong ground 
motion data were a fraction of what they are today, and understanding of ground motion behaviour 
was also far more limited. In a modern PSHA, a major effort would be made to express the 
epistemic uncertainty in ground motion, usually by employing a selection of models from the 
literature. In the early 1980s, it was reasonable to ignore epistemic uncertainty in ground motion 
models, given that PML were driven to developing the 1982 model for the lack of any suitable 
model they felt could import from elsewhere. By the late 1990s, however, so much progress had 
been	made	by	the	strong	ground	motion	modelling	community	that	ignoring	all	other	studies	was	
less defensible, especially given the inherent weaknesses of the PML (1982) model. Identified 
problems include, but are not limited to, the very limited data set on which it is based, and the use 
of a physically unrealistic formulation. If it were judged according to the criteria of Cotton et al. 
(2006), or more recently revised as Bommer et al. (2010), it would perform very badly, and would 
not be considered in any modern study.
To quote from a recent paper: “The shortcomings of the PML (1988) spectral prediction 
equations, when judged against the state-of-the-art in ground-motion prediction, are many and 
serious. However, it is an unusual quirk of the UK environment that GMPEs more than 20 years 
old are even considered fit for purpose, since in other regions of the world it is customary to 
update such equations as more data become available and as understanding of generation and 
propagation of seismic waves improves” (Bommer et al., 2011).
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5. Site studies
The SHWP were the major contributors to seismic hazard analysis for nuclear sites in the UK, 
hence the value in discussing their methodology here. However, they were not the only contributors. 
Table 1 lists the various NPP sites in the UK, current and closed, and lists the seismic hazard 
studies done for each plant. The reports themselves are not referenced, as these are generally not 
obtainable, and sometimes not complete. The two UK Atomic Energy Authority sites at Dounreay 
and Winfrith are included, but not various civilian and military sites that handle nuclear materials 
but are not actually NPPs. In any case, such studies are often off the public record (similarly, it 
would be difficult to track the history of seismic hazard as conducted for dams, chemical plants, 
etc.). The sites named in Table 1 are shown on Fig. 1. Sites left blank in Table 1 were never the 
subject of major PSHA studies, though hazard calculations may have been made for them either 
by PML in the early 1980s, or in passing in other reports. In some cases, hazard projects for the 
NPP sites in Table 1 took place over several years, and more than one report was issued. In such 
cases, only the date of the final report is given here.
Fig. 1 - Locations of UK NPP sites (including closed sites, indicated by white triangles).
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Table 1 -  Seismic hazard studies undertaken for NPPs in the UK. The year indicated is year the last PSHA study 
concluded. A site is marked as currently operational if at least one reactor is still running.
Notes: 1. Sellafield is now a nuclear reprocessing site. The former NPP at Calder Hall, close by, is closed.
Studies have not been confined to ground shaking hazard; fault rupture has also been considered. 
While the threat to safety from strong ground motion can be countered with engineering 
measures, this is not possible with rupture hazard; therefore the presence of a capable fault on a 
site represents the one seismic concern that can render a site untenable for NPP development. A 
probabilistic approach to computing fault rupture hazard was pioneered by the SHWP as early as 
1987 (Mallard and Woo, 1991).
6. Regulatory issues
The regulatory framework for nuclear facilities in the UK requires a formal and detailed safety 
case to be submitted for NPP sites before permission to construct or operate can be granted; such 
permissions are granted under the site license issued to the site owner/operator by ONR. The 
requirement for the site licensee (normally the operator) is to demonstrate that hazard at the site 
had been adequately characterised, and ONR has published guidance on what this means in its 
Safety Assessment Principles (SAP), the current edition being HSE (2006). The benchmark by 
which seismic hazard is measured is typically the PGA (with an associated response spectrum), 
conservatively defined with an annual probability of being exceeded of 10-4.
The seismic hazard “case” then normally forms a supporting reference to the wider safety 
 Name of site Study by Year Status
 Berkeley  -  Closed
 Bradwell SHWP 1991 Closed
 Chapelcross BGS & Halcrow 1993 Closed
 Dounreay Woo 1994 Closed
 Dungeness SHWP 1995 Operational
 Hartlepool SHWP 1996 Operational
 Heysham SHWP 1996 Operational
 Hinkley Point SHWP 1991 Operational
 Hunterston  -  Operational
 Oldbury  -  Closed
 Sellafield1 BGS 1992 Closed
  SHWP 1998 
 Sizewell SHWP 1992 
 Torness  -  Operational
 Trawsfynydd  -  Closed
 Winfrith  -  Closed
 Wylfa SHWP 2001 Operational
  BGS 2001 
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case justifying nuclear safety of the activities for which permission is being sought. For a major 
seismic hazard study that would be expected to support permission to operate a NPP, ONR will 
assess the technical adequacy of the case using the SAP as a guide, and historically has taken 
advantage of independent expertise in the Earth sciences community to assist in this task.
For nuclear sites without operating nuclear reactors, a more pragmatic approach can be adopted 
subject to the overriding principle that risks generally, and those from seismic hazard specifically, 
are As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
7. The future
After 1995, there was an end to new nuclear construction in the UK, and after a 2001 BGS 
assessment of seismic hazard for the Wylfa site in north Wales (opened 1971) no further major 
NPP seismic hazard assessments were completed. However, a government policy review in 2006 
announced the resumption of NPP construction, and since then there has been extensive work on 
site selection (a mixture of previous NPP locations and new sites). ONR recently commissioned 
a report on capable faulting in the UK as a general set of guidelines, and founded a permanent 
panel of reviewers to provide guidance on future hazard assessments, in place of the ad hoc expert 
reviewing arrangements of the past. PSHA studies are currently in progress for the first new build 
sites to be considered, which will doubtless reflect advances in PSHA methodology since the 
last century. Although the SSHAC system developed in the USA (Budnitz et al., 1997; USNRC, 
2012) has not been officially adopted in a UK context, SSHAC terminology is now practically 
unavoidable in PSHA discourse. Projects underway could be classified as somewhere around 
Level 2 in SSHAC definitions.
As with many countries, the nuclear emergency in Japan following the Tohoku earthquake in 
2011 provoked much reflection in the nuclear industry in the UK, notwithstanding the fact that the 
UK is in a totally different tectonic regime, and thus immune from large subduction earthquakes 
and attendant tsunamis (with the exception, perhaps, of distant effects of events such as the 1755 
Lisbon tsunami). Also, the UK has no boiling water reactors (the type used at Fukushima). With 
the exception of Sizewell B, which is a pressurised water reactor, all UK NPPs use gas-cooled 
technology.
Immediately after the earthquake, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change 
requested that Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations examine the circumstances 
of the Fukushima accident to see what lessons could be learnt to enhance the safety of the UK 
nuclear industry. The ONR report was published later the same year (Weightman, 2011).
Because the UK nuclear regulatory system is largely non-prescriptive, it is expected that 
the industry will take the prime responsibility for learning lessons, rather than relying on the 
Regulator to tell it what to do. The intention behind the ONR report was therefore to point out 
areas for review where lessons may be learnt to further improve safety, but with the industry 
taking ultimate responsibility for the safety of their nuclear facility designs and operations 
(Weightman, 2011). The major conclusion of this report was that the SAP approach to regulation 
used in the UK, goal-setting rather than deterministic and prescriptive, provided a “a robust, 
structured and comprehensive methodology for identifying design basis events” for the purposes 
of seismic safety in the UK. In addition, “the mandatory requirement for UK nuclear site licensees 
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to perform periodic reviews of their safety cases and submit them to ONR to permit continued 
operation provides a robust means of ensuring that operational facilities are adequately improved 
in line with advances in technology and standards …” (Weightman, 2011).
In response to a request from the Council of the European Union, a specification for stress 
tests for nuclear power stations was developed, and the ONR directed that these test should be 
undertaken by the nuclear industry in the UK. The results of these tests were then collected and 
published in a second report the following year (Weightman, 2012). In this report, it is concluded 
that after one year, 58% of items raised in the tests remain open; thus, at the time of writing, these 
activities are still continuing. Of particular relevance to this paper, Stress Test Finding STF-2 
states that “The nuclear industry should establish a research programme to review the Seismic 
Hazard Working Party (SHWP) methodology against the latest approaches. This should include 
a gap analysis comparing the SHWP methodology with more recent approaches such as those 
developed by the Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC)” (Weightman, 2012). At 
the time of writing, this is still ongoing.
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